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European Central Bank working paper series 64Abstract
This paper reports the results of a survey conducted by the Banque de France during Winter
2003-2004 to investigate the price-setting behavior of French manufacturing companies.
Prices are found to adjust infrequently; the median firm modifies its price only once a year.
Price reviews are more frequent than price changes; the median firm reviews its price
quarterly. Firms are found to follow either time-dependent, state-dependent or both pricing
rules. Moreover, the chosen interval of price reviews depends on the probability that changes
in the firms’ environment occur.
Coordination failure and nominal contracts (either written or implicit) are the most important
sources of price stickiness, while pricing thresholds and physical menu costs appear to be
totally unimportant.
Asymmetries in price stickiness are found to be different for cost shocks compared to demand
shocks: prices are more rigid downward than upward for cost shocks, while the reverse is true
for demand shocks.
Keywords: price rigidity, price-setting behavior, inflation persistence, survey data.
JEL classification: E31, D40, L11.
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December 2004Non-technical summary
This paper reports the results of a survey conducted by the Banque de France during Winter
2003-2004 to investigate the price-setting behavior of French manufacturing companies.
Prices are found to adjust infrequently; the first quartile and the median firms modify their
price only once a year. The third quartile twice. Price reviews are more frequent than price
changes. Among firms reviewing their price on a regular basis, the first quartile firm reviews
its price monthly, the median firm quarterly and the third quartile firm yearly.
10 to 20% of the firms have not faced at least one of the four shocks considered
(increased/decreased demand/cost shocks) within the last two years. 17% to 28% of the firms
facing one of these shocks are not able at all to modify their price. The global ability to
respond to shocks, that is independently of the speed of adjustment, does not seem to depend
on the frequency of price reviews. When firms respond to shocks, price adjustment speed
increases with the frequency of price reviews.
Our attempt to compute the proportion of firms following either time-dependent, state-
dependent, or both pricing rules leads to the following figures : 39% of the firms follow time-
dependent pricing rules, whereas 6% use state-dependent rules, and 55% use both. To classify
firms between those following time-dependent and those following state-dependent pricing
rules was a hard task, because more than half of them seem to use both rules, even thus the
previous mentioned rules could appear to be contradictory from a simple theoretical point of
view. In fact, it seems that the time length between price reviews is endogenous to the
variability of the firms’ environment. Time-dependent rules can than be viewed as the result
of the optimization of a state-dependent rule under a predictable environment.
Three theories of price stickiness have a high ranking: cost-based pricing, coordination failure
and nominal contracts. In the middle comes a group of four theories that earn “average”
grades: implicit contracts, temporary shocks, demand shocks, and the number of competitors
as an indicator of competitive pressures. Three theories are in the bottom group: pricing
thresholds, the explanation that mix inventories and delivery delays, and costly price
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December 2004Individual price changes over the year 2003 are huge compared to the aggregate IPPI
increase: -5% (+3%) for the median decrease (increase), as against 0.3% for the IPPI. Price
increases are more likely (70%) than price decreases (30%) among price changes. The
magnitude of positive price changes over the year 2003 (+3% for the median increase) is
lower than the one of negative price changes (-5%). Thus, the IPPI growth rate observed in
manufacturing reflects the higher frequency of price increases compared to price decreases,
and not the higher magnitude of price increases compared to price decreases.
Asymmetries are found to be different for cost shocks compared to demand shocks: prices are
more rigid downward than upward for cost shocks, while the reverse is true for demand
shocks (prices are more rigid upward than downward).
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The interest in building better micro foundations to macroeconomic behavior in general, and
price stickiness in particular, has dramatically increased recently (see Taylor (1999) and
Woodford (2003) for a synthesis, and among others, Whelan (2004) and Mash (2004), as
examples of recent attempts).
However, the microeconomic evidence on pricing behavior has been rather limited thus far—
mainly due to a lack of data, despite the need to establish the form of pricing rules supported
by the micro data. Given the very few studies using data on individual companies, Blinder et
al. (1998) investigated price-setting by asking directly to decision makers why they do not
change their prices more often. Other recent survey research on pricing has been conducted by
Hall et al. (2000) for the U.K., and Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden.
Many economists are reluctant to use the interview method mainly for two reasons. First,
responses may be terribly sensitive to the precise wording of the questions, and second,
interviewees may have no incentive to respond truthfullyor thoughtfully. But it is very uneasy
to test theories of price rigidities with traditional econometric tools. Indeed, these theories all
predict that prices adjust less rapidly than some unmeasured Walrasian benchmark and often
rely on variables that are unmeasurable themselves. So it is quite impossible to distinguish
among price stickiness theories with traditional methods. The survey approach has the
advantage to allow to ask directly to decision makers why they do not adjust their price faster
in response to shocks, and thus to provide a useful complement to more traditional tools.
Following this approach, the eurosystem has decided to devote a large part of its « Inflation
Persistence Network » research program to investigate price-setting behavior in most of the
euro-area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Each country has designed and conducted a survey on a
national basis, but with a large degree of comparability with other euro-area countries. Survey
results are already available for Austria in Kwapil et al (2004), Italy in Fabiani et al (2004),
and the Netherlands in Hoeberichts and Stokman (2004).
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France during Winter 2003-2004 to investigate the price-setting behavior of French
manufacturing companies.4 It drew on the surveys already available in September 2003.5 The
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the survey. In section 3, we present results
regarding the market structure, the type of customers, and the type of costs faced by
manufacturing firms. Section 4 and 5 examine respectively price setting and price adjustment
behaviors. Section 6 is devoted to the ratings of price stickiness theories by decision makers.
Section 7 examines the role of asymmetries. Section 8 concludes.
2T h e s u r v e y
The survey was carried out by the Survey Division of the Banque de France, with the
collaboration of local branches, during Winter 2003-2004.
The population belonging to the original sample was the same as that listed by the Banque de
France for the manufacturing monthly business survey (around 4300 firms). This population
mostly consists of firms with more than 20 employees, from all over France and all types of
manufacture. Firms were allowed to answer either by phone, in face-to-face interviews, or by
phone and mail, depending on their preferences and the organization of the local Banque de
France’s branch which was collecting the answers. More than 10% of the firms answered the
questionnaire during a face-to-face interview as against less than 25% during a phone
interview. For a given questionnaire, the proportion of questions with no answer is
significantly lower when a face-to-face interview is conducted compared to a phone or mixed
procedure. Questionnaires were mainly answered by CEO or CFO. 1662 firms answered the
questionnaire, thus the global response rate was around 40%. Details by manufacture, size and
geographical area are given in table 2.1. Differences in the response rate were quite limited
but it is worth noticing that the response rate declines with the size of firms. At the local level,
relationship between medium size firms and Banque de France’s branches are closer than with
larger firms.
4 Other results for France for other aspects of the IPN research program can be found in Baudry et al. (2004) and Bilke (2004).
5 Blinder et al. (1998), Hall et al. (2000), Appel et al. (2001), and Fabiani et al. (2004).
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monthly business survey. At the first step, individual answers are aggregated around 250
product groups of the four-digit Nace industry code using number of employees by firms as
weight. For the second step, product groups are aggregated using value added as weight.
Usually, individual firms behavior have a mild impact on results for total industry.
Nevertheless, when we study below the break down of total industry, biggest firms can play
an important role. In this respect, results for motor vehicles must be analyzed with caution.
As in Blinder et al., the questionnaire (see Appendix A) includes a variety of factual
information about the company, such as its size, how often it changes prices, to whom it sells,
and so on (Questions 1 to 8, 12 and 17). Contrary to Blinder et al., we do not take it for
granted that almost all firms in the manufacturing industry are price makers rather than price
takers (Question 9). Special emphasis is devoted to the issues of price reviews and price
adjustments (Questions 10, 11, 15 and 16). Ten theories of sticky prices were selected for
testing (Questions 13 and 14).
The survey refers to the firms’ “main product”, defined as the one that generated the highest
turnover in 2003. The decision to focus on the main product is in the line of what has been
done by Apel et al. (2001) for Sweden and by Fabiani et al. (2004) for Italy. For 70% of the
responding firms the share of the main product is quite large: more than 40% of turnover (see
table 2.2). Therefore, despite a very few exceptions, the main product was easy to identify.
3 Market structure, type of customers, and costs
If one wants to know more about price stickiness one has to compare « stickiness » to some
price adjustment process within a Walrasian benchmark world. In the usual textbook model,
firms are supposed to act in a purely competitive market and to produce with an increasing
marginal cost technology. When some of these assumptions are not verified anymore, real
rigidities get involved in the price adjustment process. We examine below the answers to
questions about market structure, the type of customers, and the marginal cost function shape.
9
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 423
December 20043.1 Market structure
In a purely competitive world, firms are supposed to be atomistic and to have no market
power. For this to be true, the number of competitors must be large enough on the national
market as well as on the foreign market. That is why firms were asked whether or not they
were selling their main product mainly in France, and to how many competitors they were
confronted to on the French market.
Firms participating in the survey sell their product mainly in France, with the exception of the
motor-vehicle industry for which the most important market is the euro area (see table 3.1.a,
for more details). As regards to competition, 8% of the firms have no competitor at all, 13%
of them have one or two, 24% three or four, 30% five to ten, 9% eleven to 20, and 11% more
than 20. Some discrepancies exist across types of goods. More than 70% of firms in the
motor-vehicle industry have 5 to 10 competitors, as against around 25% for other sectors ;
almost 15% of the firms have no competitors at all in the capital goods sector (see table 3.1.b.
for more details).
These figures are not consistent at all with the assumption of atomistic firms, as more than ¾
of them have less than 10 competitors. So firms have plenty of opportunities to use some kind
of market power (depending on the market structure: monopoly, oligopoly, or monopolistic
competition).
3.2 Type of customers
When considering continuously price adjustment, one has in mind auction markets for
commodities or financial instruments. To distinguish markets with infrequent price changes
from the previous ones, Okun (1981) used the term “Customer markets”. In this case,
continuous price adjustment for market-clearing leaves place to long term relationships with
customers. For example, firms may trade off the gains from charging monopoly premia
against the benefits of encouraging repeat purchases. These relationships are supposed to
depend on the type of customers. That is why firms were asked to whom they are mainly
selling their products. Most sales are made to other businesses rather than to consumers. 55%
10
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selling their product on an usual way), as against 25% to consumers (see table 3.2 for more
details). Discrepancies exist among sectors. Of course, the sector with the fewer direct sales to
consumers is the intermediate good sector with 12% of the sales to consumers. Apart motor
vehicles coming far before others with 65% of sales directly to consumers6 t h et y p eo fg o o d
the most sold directlyto consumers is food.
3.3 Marginal cost function shape
In the usual theoretical framework, marginal costs are supposed to be increasing. This is a
necessary condition to get increasing supply curves under the assumption of profit
maximization. If marginal costs are constant, the firms' supply curves are constant too, and
the supply elasticity to prices is infinite. Thus, shifts in demand are supposed to lead to
variations in the quantity produced but not in prices. Constant marginal costs are thus, another
source of price rigidity. That is why we tried to learn more about firms' costs. Unfortunately,
it is very hard to question firms about their marginal costs. First, this concept is too
complicated to be explained in layman’s words, and second it is quite hard to compute. Thus,
firms were asked about their unit variable costs. The question was “How do your unit variable
costs change when there is an increase in the level of production?”. 36% of firms answered
that their unit variable cost is constant, thus indirectly that their marginal cost is constant.
Surprisingly, there is almost no discrepancies among sectors, if one except the “motor
vehicles” line, which must be analyzed with caution due to the concentration of this sector,
and the weak response rate for larger firms to the whole questionnaire in general and to this
question in particular (see table 3.3 for more details).
Keeping these elements in mind, we turn now to the description of the price-setting process.
6 Remember that this sector is very concentrated, so this line must be taken with cautious, and that the share of individual cars
in value added is very important.
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Price-setting is analyzed from three points of view: the way firms take into account price
market competition in setting their price (question 9), the way they use price discrimination
(question 6), and the proportion of them that incorporate expectations when setting their
current price (question 11).
The underpinning idea of the proposed answers to question 9 was that a firm using a mark-up
rule should have some market power and not set its price at its marginal cost. Regarding
market power no clear-cut answer emerges from the survey at the first sight. The proportion
of firms applying a mark-up rule upon unit variable cost reaches 37%, as against 35% for
firms saying that they are price takers (see table 4.1). The analyze of the answer ‘other’—
17% of the firms—and comments provided show first that a large proportion of ‘other’ is
related either to price-setter or price-taker behavior. Second, comments point to a large range
of practices including: price is fully set by customers (negotiated annually or decided on a
case by case basis); price is fixed for several years with an indexation rule; price is the result
of an open market procedure; price is defined as an internal sale price to firms that belong to
the same group; price depends on marketing or strategic policy.
If a rule exists for setting price it is only a guide line, because most of the firms have a rather
pragmatic behavior regarding commercial transactions. Indeed, only 19% of the firms charge
the same price to all the customers (see table 4.2), and the bulk of firms decide their price on
case-by-case basis (49%). Nevertheless, 26% of the firms discriminate prices according to a
quantity rule.
Against this background it is worth noticing that, when setting their price, more than 60% of
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In this section we try to assess how firms adjust their price in responses to shocks. The
theoretical literature mainly considers two types of behaviors: time-dependent and state-
dependent pricing rules. Time-dependent models, either with deterministic, Taylor (1980), or
stochastic, Calvo (1983), process of price change, assume that firms can not freely modify
their prices at anytime in response to shocks, contrary to state-dependent models in which
firms are allowed to change their prices as soon as necessary.7
Thus, as long as information gathering and price changes are costless, state-dependent pricing
models assume that firms continuously review their prices in order to modify them
instantaneously in response to shocks. In a world with some information gathering costs,
continuous price reviews become “frequent” price reviews. And if price changes are costly,
price changes are not instantaneous any more but happen only when prices get sufficiently
“out of line”. Nevertheless, as in a state-dependent pricing rule world firms want to be aware
of shocks, in order to react as fast as possible, price reviews must be a lot more frequent than
price changes. Schematically, on the opposite, in a time-dependent pricing rule world, firms
only change their price infrequently, but on a periodic basis, as they are not able to change
their prices as soon as they would need to respond to shocks. As a consequence, state-
dependent pricing rules are supposed to lead to frequent small price changes, and time-
dependent pricing rules to periodic infrequent large price changes. How frequent price
changes are in a state-dependent model is supposed to depend on the shape of the adjustment
cost function. Lump-sum costs (menu costs) are supposed to lead to not so frequent and not so
small price changes as convex cost (Rotemberg (1982)) functions.
The four next sub-sections try to add some empirical evidence to this classification. We first
compare frequency of price reviews and changes. Second, we report results about the ability
of firms to respond to shocks. Third, we try to infer from the first two sub-sections whether or
not firms are following state-dependent pricing rules. Some comments about the magnitude of
price changes are given in sub-section 4.
7 See for instance, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977).
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Prices are found to adjust infrequently; the first quartile and the median firms modify the price
of their main product only once a year, and the third quartile twice. Price reviews are more
frequent than price changes. Among firms reviewing their price on a regular basis, the first
quartile firm reviews its price monthly, the median firm quarterly and the third quartile firm
yearly. Details are given below.
Most of the firms have reported reviewing the price of their main product on a regular basis
(see table 5.1.1): only 8% of them have no usual frequency to review their prices. 80% of the
firms review their price at least once a year, 43% at least quarterly, 47% at least twice a year,
and 25% at least monthly.8 Among the firms reviewing their price on a regular basis, the
median firm reviews its price quarterly in France. This is also the case in Austria and in the
Netherlands.9
Despite these quite frequent reviews, price changes are not that numerous (see table 5.1.2). If
one discards the 25% non available answers, around 20% of firms did not change their price
in 2003, around 45% changed it once and 20% twice. So the median French manufacturing
firm changed its price only once in 2003. This was also the case for the median firm in
Austria, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands.10 On average French firms changed their price
1.7 time in 2003, thus the implicit duration of price was 7 months.11
Price reviews then appear to be more frequent than price changes.
8 These figures are reported on the line « Cumulative total ».
9 In Italy and Belgium the median firm reviews its price only once a year.
10 The reference year is not exactly 2003 for all countries.
11 This figure is simply the inverse of 1.7 multiplied by 12. One can not compute the average of implicit duration by firm as a
lot of number of price changes are equal to zero. These 7 months are not strictly comparable to the 5 months obtained by
Baudry et al. (2004) from the consumption price index for two reasons: the period is not the same and the survey on price-
setting behavior includes manufacturing producer prices.
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firms reviewing their price yearly have changed their price once, 22% have kept their price
unchanged, and unexpectedly 7% have changed it twice. 44% of those reviewing their price
twice a year have changed their price twice, 37% once, and 8% have not modified their price
at all. Only 11% of the firms reviewing their price four times a year have changed it between
3 and 6 times during the year. And only 7% of the firms reviewing their price monthly have
changed it more than 7 times12. 17% of the firms (at least13) that review their price daily have
changed their price only once in 2003.
Another interesting feature is that firms that have no usual frequency of price review do not
change their price more often than the average (see table 5.1.3). One could have thought that
if they report to have no usual frequency, it was because they were reviewing their price on a
more state dependent basis.14 I ts e e m st h a tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s e( s e eb e l o w ) .O nt h ec o n t r a r y ,
firms answering “other” to question 10 on frequency of price reviews change their price more
often than the average, and specify that they are reviewing their price on a case by case basis.
So it seems that they review their price on a state-dependent basis.
5.2 Price responses to shocks
10 to 20% of the firms have not faced at least one of the four shocks considered
(increased/decreased demand/cost shocks) within the last two years. 17% to 28% of the firms
facing one of these shocks are not able at all to modify their price. The global ability to
respond to shocks, that is independently of the speed of adjustment, does not seem to depend
on the frequency of price reviews. When firms respond to shocks, price adjustment speed
increases with the frequency of price reviews. The context and some explanations about these
facts are given below.
12 Note that the frequency of the non available answers is 25% in this last case.
13 Remember that 27.9% of the firms did not answer, but probably those who did not answer are the one with quite a lot of price
changes.
14 This is the assumption made by Blinder et al. (1998).
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information, which does not necessarily induce a price change.15 This is consistent with one of
the two following facts: either nothing significant happens or firms can not change their price
as often as they want to. To document these points, we examine responses to question 15 and
16. Question 15 (resp. 16) is “Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change in your
environment (resp. unit variable production costs), do you modify the price of your main
product? ». The answering alternatives to questions 15 and 16 were mutually exclusive. Firms
were asked to tick either 'yes' (in this case they should provided the reaction delay either
'shorter than 1 month', 'within 1 and 3 months' or 'more than 3 months'), 'only partly' (in this
case the reaction delay was not specified), 'no', or 'this situation has not arisen during the last
two years'. The exact wording on the questionnaire was not 'only partly', but 'with difficulty';
but it was clear from the accompanying note to the questionnaire that firms should tick this
answer only if they could not respond fully to shocks. The first next sub-section examines the
different proportions of each answers to question 15 and 16.
As firms do not have always the possibility to modify their price in the case of a major and
lasting change in their environment or their unit variable costs, we try in the second sub-
section to establish whether or not the probability to change prices and the speed of
adjustment are independent of the timing of price reviews. To get an idea, responses to
questions about the possibility to modify prices (questions 15 and 16) are crossed with
questions on the timing of price reviews (question 10).
5.2.a Different answers to shocks
To respond to shocks, one has to face shocks
One can infer from tables 5.2.a.1 and 5.2.a.2, that nothing significant has happened to roughly
10 to 20% of the firms16, depending on the nature of the shock, within the last two years.17
15 Zbaracki et al. (2003) find that information gathering costs account for 7.8% of the total cost of price adjustment.
16 Discarding the non available answers.
17 We do not have any other information about the frequency of demand or cost shocks in the survey.
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If one assumes that firms face significant shocks, 17% to 28%18 of them, depending on the
nature of the shock, do not modify their prices (see tables 5.2.a.1 and 5.2.a.2).19 We are then
left with 72% to 83% of firms that are able to change their price at some point, but often with
a delay.
Heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment
When firms fully respond to shocks, around 30% of the firms do it with a delay longer than
three months in the case of a demand shock. More than 50% of the firms respond with a delay
longer than three months in the case of a cost shock.20
5.2.b Response to shocks and frequency of price reviews
Answers to question 15 and 16 examined in paragraph 5.2.a.1 and 5.2.a.2 are now crossed
with the frequency of price reviews, obtained from question 10, in tables 5.2.b.1 and 5.2.b.2.
We examine the crossed answers in the same order than the direct answers in paragraph 5.2.a.
The frequency of price reviews increases with the probability that shocks occur
Our comments focus on the line “This situation has not arisen during the last two years”, that
is on firms for which the examined type of shocks has not occurred in a recent past. The
frequency of price reviews is found to decrease with the probability that no shocks occur. For
instance, in the case of “lower demand or increased competition”, 23% of the firms reviewing
their price once a year have not faced this kind of shock within the last two years, as against
respectively 13, 11, 6 and 2% for the firms reviewing their price twice a year, quarterly,
monthly, and weekly (see table 5.2.b.1). This phenomenon is also true for increased demand
18 This figures are computed discarding N.A. and ‘this situation has not arisen during thelast two years’.
19 Kwapil et al. (2004) report that the fraction of Austrian firms holding their price constant, depending on the nature of the
shock, is included between 8% (for large cost-push shock) and 63% (for large positive demand shocks).
20 In the case of Austria, Kwapil et al (2004) report that the mean lag to respond to shocks is roughly 4 months. Details on
asymmetries are discussed below.
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with the frequency of price reviews, one can infer that the percentage of firms facing the
considered shocks increases with the frequency of price reviews. As the relation we are
interested in is the other wayround, we have also computed the repartition of the frequency of
price reviews among those answering that the situation has not arisen during the last two years
by type of shock (see table 5.2.b.3).
Despite the lack of further information on the shocks faced by firms, we can argue that the
chosen interval of price reviews depends on the probability that changes in the firms’
environment occur. 21 In other words, the length of time interval between price reviews is
partly chosen accounting for the variability of the state of the economy the firms are
confronted to. Thus, it is partly endogenous.
Final response to shocks does not depend on the frequency of price reviews
We focus on the percentage of firms answering they do not respond to shocks at all, that is the
line “no” in tables 5.2.b.1 and 5.2.b.2). For instance, in the case of “lower demand or
increased competition”, the proportion of firms answering “no” conditionally on the fact that
they are reviewing their price weekly, monthly, quarterly or twice a year are 2.2, 19.8, 6.3,
and 31.3. So there is no monotone relation between the frequency of price reviews and the
probability to change prices.22 The fact that the probability to respond to shocks (regardless of
the delay) does not depend on the frequency of price reviews sounds reasonable ; firms have
to react at some point, otherwise they go bankrupt.
Price adjustment speed increases with the frequency of price reviews
The probability of a firm to adjust its price quickly increases with the frequency of price
reviews. For instance, in the case of “lower demand or increased competition”, only 4% of
firms reviewing their price twice a year are able to modify their price within a month, as
21 For instance, the firm could have to face a demand or cost shock.
22 We thus implicitly assumed that the line “only partly » could be added to the line «Yes». One can not find any monotone
relation either when adding this line to the line « No ». Dropping the column « twice a year» that has been created ex-post,
do not change anything either.
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weekly (see table 5.2.b.1). This phenomena is also true for increased demand and cost shocks
(see table 5.2.b.2).
Unexpectedly, 4 to 11% of the firms change their price faster than they review their price in
response to a major and lasting change in their environment23, depending on the type of shock.
As far as the firms that do not report reviewing their price on a periodic basis are concerned, it
seems that the firms answering “no usual frequency” have more difficulty to change their
price than the average. They react less than the average, and thus are not state-dependent. But
firms answering “other” change their price quite easily, which is consistent with the fact that
they specify setting their price on a case-by-case basis, and thus are state-dependent.
5.3 Time-dependent versus state-dependent pricing rules
This sub-section has two goals. First, we try to classify firms in three categories: the one
following both time and state-dependent pricing rules, those following mainly state-dependent
rules, and those following time-dependent pricing rules only. Second, we try to understand
whether or not there exists a link between time and state-dependent pricing rules.
5.3.a Relative proportions of time-dependent and state-dependent pricing rules
Our attempt to compute the proportion of firms following either time-dependent, state-
dependent, or both pricing rules leads to the following figures : 39% of the firms follow time-
dependent pricing rules, whereas 6% use state-dependent rules, and 55% use both. Fabiani et
al. (2004) report that 40% of the Italian firms adopt time-dependent rules, as against 14%
which use state-dependent rules, and 46% which use both state and time-dependent pricing
strategies. Kwapil et al. (2004) report respectively the following shares for Austria, 41%,
27%, and 32%. The shares reported for Belgium in Aucremanne and Druant (2004) are
respectively 26%, 34%, and 40%, and the ones for the Netherlands reported in Hoeberichts
and Stokman (2004) are 36%, 46%, and 18%. Hall et al (1997) obtain that in the U.K. time-
dependent pricing is more common than state dependent pricing, with 79% of the respondents
reporting that they review their prices at a specific frequency, as against 11% of companies
23 These figures are computed by adding the number of firms reviewing their price quarterly and reacting with a delay shorter
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state-dependent pricing.
Computing theses figures for France was very uneasy, because our questionnaire was not
asking directly to firms whether, under normal conditions, they were reviewing their price on
a regular basis or in response to specific events. They were asked, question 10, “In general,
how often do you review the price of your main product (without necessarily changing it)?”,
and question 15 (and 16), “Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change in your
environment (unit variable production costs), do you have the possibility of altering the price
of your main product?”. We used the crossed tables 5.2.b.1 and 5.2.b.2 to construct the above
mentioned figures.
It is generally admitted that state-dependent firms are supposed to review their price
continuously or at least very frequently. Blinder et al. (1998) argue that firms that change
prices less often than every fourth price review should be viewed as pursuing state-dependent
pricing strategies instead of time-dependent rules. Apel et al. (2001) argue that firms
reviewing their prices daily check their prices often enough to be considered as state-
dependent. If one looks at table 5.2.b.1 in the case of a lower demand for instance, one can
notice that 37% to 78% of the firms reviewing their price at least quarterly are able to change
their price within 3 months in responses to lower demand shocks, as against only 17% to 19%
of firms reviewing their price at most twice a year. As things are quite similar for the three
other types of shocks, we will consider the firms reviewing their price at least quarterly as
both time and state-dependent.24 Firms reviewing their price at most twice a year are
considered as time-dependent only, except when they report being able to modify their price
within 3 months in the event of a major and lasting change in their environment.
Firms answering “other” to question 10, are considered as purely state-dependent as they
mostly set their price on a case-by-case basis.
 
Firms answering “no usual frequency” to question 10, are discarded along with the “non
available answers” to this question. Indeed, contrary to what was assumed by Blinder et al.
(1998), these firms are not state-dependent. As they do not review their price on a regular
basis either, we do not know anything about them.
24 As we have seen in section 5.2.b price adjustment speed increases with the frequency of price reviews.
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to 39%25 (from 81% of the firms reporting reviewing their price on a regular basis). In Blinder
et al. (1998), the fraction with meaningful periodic price reviews declines from 60% to 40%
of the total when they remove firms that change prices less often than every fourth review and
those reporting that they change prices more often than they have price reviews. Applying
Blinder’s “methodology” instead of ours would have given a share of 50% of “pure” time
dependent firms instead of 39%.
5.3.b The endogeneity of time-pricing rules
In the previous paragraph, we have tried to classify firms between those following time-
dependent and those following state-dependent pricing rules. It was a hard task, because more
than half of them seem to use both rules, even thus the previous mentioned rules could appear
to be contradictory from a simple theoretical point of view. In this paragraph, we use the
results from paragraph 5.2.b to asses that the two rules are linked together. In fact, it seems
that the time length between price reviews is endogenous to the variability of their
environment. Time-dependent rules can than be viewed as the result of the optimization of a
state-dependent rule under a predictable environment.26 Details are given below.
It has been pointed at in paragraph 5.2.b that the length of time interval between price reviews
is partly chosen accounting for the variability of the state of the economy the firms are
confronted to, and thus is partly endogenous. This statement on the length of time interval
between price reviews is consistent with the following two facts observed by Apel et al.
(2001) in Sweden. First, Swedish firms report that one major explanation for not reviewing
prices more often is that “factors influencing the price do not change often enough to motivate
more frequent price reviews".27 Second, under normal conditions, state and time-dependent
price setting rules are of more or less equal importance in Sweden, but when significant
events occur, 21% of the firms that normally follow a time-dependent pricing rule shift to
state-dependent pricing, making in this case state-dependent pricing rules a lot more common
than time dependent rules (69% against 23%) . The results obtained for Sweden are consistent
25 This is the average figure computed from the four figures obtained from the four types of shocks. The differences among the
shocks are quite small.
26 Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) provide examples of state dependent optimization under
inflation that results in fixed intervals of constant duration during which the nominal price is fixed.
27 The other main explanation they report is that « price could not change more often without disturbing customer relations».
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basis conditional on the fact that the state of the economy is “normal”.
5.4 Individual price changes are quite huge
Individual price changes over the year 2003 are huge compared to the aggregate IPPI
increase: -5% (+3%) for the median decrease (increase), as against 0.3% for the IPPI.
Table 5.4.1 reports the percentage of firms changing their price and the magnitude of price
changes over the year 2003. As the magnitude is known only between the beginning and the
end of the year, we consider only the price change between January and December 2003. The
last column documents the evolution of the French Industrial Production Price Index by type
of good in 2003 for reference purposes.
Discrepancies exist among types of goods: the magnitude is the highest for capital goods and
the lowest for motor vehicles.
The total price change over the year increases with the number of price changes but not
smoothly (see table 5.4.2): the total magnitude of price changes is higher for one price change
compared to 2, but lower for 1 or 2 price changes compared to 3 to 12.
If one assumes that all the price changes within a year for one firm are of the same sign, one
can compute the average magnitude of price changes per firm in 2003 (see the last row in
table 5.4.2). The first (third) quartile of the average magnitude of price increases (decreases)
is +1% (-2%). Obviously, these figures are smaller than the total price changes, but their
magnitude is still sizable compared to the average inflation rate for 2003 (+0.3%).
There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the price-setting behavior depending on the
type of good (see table 5.4.1). This applies both to the decisions to change prices and the
magnitude of price changes. This contrasts with the considerable homogeneity in the rates of
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decisions to change prices are concerned, prices for intermediate goods change more
frequently in France than those for consumer goods, contrary to what is observed for Portugal
by Dias et al. (2004). This might be due to the fact that intermediate goods are sold to firms
and not to households. Firms are probably less afraid to ‘antagonize’ other firms with price
variations as they can explain to them why these variations are justified.28 Zbaracki et al.
(2003) studying managerial and customer costs of price adjustment using data from a large
U.S. industrial manufacturer and its customers offer qualitative evidence of customer
‘antagonization’ cost. This is consistent with the fact that price changes at intermediate level
are not passed on to customers.
This large magnitude of price changes would argue in favor of menu cost (such as, Mankiw
(1985)) against quadratic adjustment costs (such as, Rotemberg (1982)). However, we’ll see
below that the menu cost theory is not supported at all by decision makers. Zbaracki et al.
(2003) studying a 8000-product manufacturing firm find that cost adjustments are the sum of
three types of costs: menu, managerial, and customer costs. Their relative weights in total
price adjustment are respectively 4%, 23% and 73% ; menu costs are not found to be convex,
while many components of managerial and customer costs are. This should lead to small and
numerous price changes. But the firm they studied follows a once-a-year price adjustment
policy despite ample opportunities to change prices at other times during the year. The firms’
managers report that pricing activities are deeply embedded in existing social structure, and
that customers would not stand more than one price change per year.29 It seems thus, that this
firm has to deal with convex costs under a once-a-year price adjustment constraint. This
would be consistent with our data: large infrequent changes despite a very bad grade to the
menu cost theory.
We turn now to more theoretical explanations of price stickiness.
28 Rotemberg (2002) develops a model were consumers care about the fairness of prices and react negatively only when they
become convinced that prices are unfair.
29 In Blinder et al. (1998), the first reason given by respondents for not changing prices more frequently than what they do is
that ‘it would antagonize or cause difficulties for their customers’.
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The main goal of the survey is to find out which theories of price stickiness are validated by
decision makers. We started from Blinder’s list.30 A few adjustments were made. Following
Blinder (1994), six theories were chosen directly out of his twelve theories list, namely,
nominal contracts, implicit contracts, pricing points, cost-based pricing, costs of price
adjustment, and coordination failure. Two others were examined but in the same package:
inventories and delivery lags. Four theories of the one listed by Blinder were discarded:
hierarchical delays, judging quality by price, procyclical elasticity, and constant marginal
cost. The first one was discarded in order to save time and because we did not feel it was
really important. The second one was not kept because the survey department thought it was
unfair to ask firms whether price reductions were due to a reduction in quality. The third one
was discarded because it was deemed too complicated to explain in short plain French and so
was the last one because firms were asked about their marginal cost31 elsewhere in the survey.
Despite the survey was not asking directly about procyclical elasticity, a question was added
about the consequences of a shock in demand. Along the same lines, another question was
added about the consequences of a variation in the number of competitors. The latter was
supposed to capture the degree of market competitiveness and the consequence of a shock in
the aggregate supply.
These ten theories were embodied in two set of questions: Q13 and Q14, which were phrased
in two different ways. The first one asked whether several of the theories would induce a price
change and the second one whether other theories32 would deter a price change. Respondents
were asked to codethe responses on the following four-point scale:
1 = unimportant
2 = of minor importance
3 = important
4 = very important
This scale is roughly the same as that used in Blinder et al. (1998).
30 See Blinder (1994), Blinder et al. (1998), and Hall et al. (1997) for a brief description of these theories.
31 It turns out in the end that firms answered on the basis of their average unit variable cost and not on the basis of their
marginal cost.
32 The question about coordination failure was an exception and phrased twice.
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the ten testedtheories.33
Table 6.1 ranks the theories by mean scores. Three theories have a high ranking: cost-based
pricing, coordination failure and nominal contracts. In the middle comes a group of four
theories that earn “average” grades: implicit contracts, temporary shocks, demand shocks, and
the number of competitors as an indicator of competitive pressures. Three theories are in the
bottom group: pricing thresholds, the explanation that mix inventories and delivery delays,
and costly price adjustment (mainly seen as menu costs). These results are broadly in line of
those obtained by other surveys (see table 6.2).
Differences in the rating of the theories by type of goods, while occasionally present, are
typically not large and thus are not reported. Asymmetries in the rating of the theories are
discussed below (§ 7.3).
7 Asymmetries
Asymmetries are studied from four points of view: first, the percentage of firms changing
their price in 2003 and magnitude in price changes, second, the opportunity to change prices
in response to four types of shocks—increase/decrease in demand/costs, third, reasons of
these changes (ratings of the theories) and fourth, the differences induced by firms’
characteristics, market structure and so on in the responses to shocks.
7.1 Percentage of firms changing their price in 2003 and magnitude in price changes
Price increases are more likely than price decreases: price increases account for around 70 %
of total changes (see table 5.4.2). The magnitude of positive price changes is lower than the
one of negative price changes: +3% for the median increase and –5% for the median decrease
33 As pointed by Blinder one has to keep in mind that a plausible standard of excellence would be an average rating of 3.0─which is
equivalent to half the firms rating the theory as “of minor importance” and half rating it as “very important”. On the low end, an average
score of 1.0 would mean that every single respondent totally rejected the theory. So it is perhaps more useful to think of the likely range of
survey results not as going from 4.0 to 1.0, but rather from a top score of3.0 for a wonderful theory to 1.5 for a disastrous one.
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higher frequency of price increases compared to price decreases, and not the higher
magnitude of price increases compared to price decreases.
Hoeberichts and Stokman (2004) report that in the Netherlands price increases are also more
frequent than price decreases (price increases account for 65% of total changes in
manufacturing as against 35% for price decreases), and that the median decrease (-10%) is
twice as large as the median increase (+5%) for manufacturing in 2003.
The results for France even obtained by a different technique (survey instead of IPPI), on a
different period (2003 instead of 1995:1-2001:1) may also be compared to those obtained by
Dias et al. (2004) for Portugal34. In their case, the 70%-30% rule of positive-negative price
changes turns to a 60%-40% rule35, and the magnitudes of positive and negative price changes
are the same. Inflation is thus also the result of more frequent, positive price changes
compared to negative ones.
The figures from the 2003 French survey on price-setting in manufacturing can also be
compared to the figures obtained by Baudry et al. (2004) from the price records used for
computing the French CPI from 1994:7 to 2003:2. Increases account for 60% of total changes,
as against 40% for decreases. The magnitude of the median increase (+4%) is also smaller
than the one of the median decrease (-5%).
7.2 Asymmetries in responses to shocks
Survey respondents were also asked to specify whether or not they were able to change their
price in the case of a major and lasting event, and if yes how long after the shock. Prices are
found to be more rigid downward than upward in the case of cost shocks. The opposite is true,
for demand shocks (prices are more rigid upward than downward). When firms respond to
shocks, they react faster to a demand decrease compared to an increase. There is no evidence
that firms respond faster to positive cost shocks than to negative ones. Firms are found to
react faster to demand shocks compared to cost shocks. Details are given below.
34 Their computations are on a monthly basis and not on annual basis.
35 The gap for consumer goods and intermediate goods is smaller as the ratios of price increases computed from the French
survey data are respectively 63 and 64%.
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To allow comparisons in the frequency of price changes, we restrict our analysis to the firms
who have faced the four type of shocks considered (increase/decrease in demand/costs) during
the last two years, in order to have the same sample of firms in each case.
We are left with 963 observations (see table 7.2.a). Our comments first focus on the line “Yes,
changes are reported on prices”. It seems more necessary to change prices when demand is
lowering than increasing: more firms change their prices when they face a decrease compared
to an increase in demand (+1.2 points).36 This is the other way round for costs. It seems a lot
more frequent to change prices when costs are increasing: many more firms change their
prices when they face higher costs compared to lower costs (+8.4 points). Comparison among
types of shocks is uneasy. It seems that the share of firms that modify their price in response
to shocks is the highest for increasing cost shocks (82% of the firms respond at least partly),
and the lowest for decreasing cost shocks (73% of the firms respond). In the middle come the
share of firms that modify their price in response to negative (78% of response) and positive
(77% of response) demand shocks.37 Kwapil et al. (2004) report that 63% and 52% of the
firms hold their price constant in response to respectively large positive and negative demand
shocks (thus, 37% and 48% of the firms respond to demand shocks). Furthermore, 8% and
38% of Austrian firms hold their prices constant in the case of large increasing and decreasing
cost shocks (thus, 92% and 62% respond to cost shocks). So, Austrian firms react more to cost
shocks than to demand shocks.
It is hard to comment on the amplitude of answers to shocks. When they respond to shocks
firms seem to respond more fully in the case of lower demand (80 % of full responses in the
total of responses), than in the case of increased demand (72%). Things are the same for cost
shocks, firms respond more fully in the case of negative cost shocks (72%) as against positive
cost shocks (59%).
36 The equality of the two coefficients is statistically rejected at the5% level.
37 The equality of all these coefficients on apair-wise basis is statistically rejected at the 5% level.
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To allow comparisons between the speed of adjustment, we restrict our analysis to the firms
that answered that they were able to change prices in response to the four type of shocks.
Unfortunately, we are left with only 335 firms, and they cover only 55 % of the
manufacturing sector.38 Results are given in Table 7.2.b. Firms react faster to a decrease in
demand (37.2% of the firms react within one month) than to an increase (34.7%).39 There is
no evidence that firms react faster to an increase in cost than to a decrease.40 Contrarily to us,
Kwapil et al. (2004) find no evidence that in the case of large demand shocks Austrian firms
react faster to a decrease in demand than to an increase.41 However, they find evidence that
Austrian firms react faster to an increase in costs than to a decrease.42
Blinder (1994) does not find any evidence, on the U.S., that firms respond more rapidly to
cost shocks than to demand shocks. This is also the case in Kwapil et al. (2004) for Austria.43
In France, manufacturing firms are found to respond more rapidly to demand shocks than to
cost shocks. If one considers shocks that lead to an increase in prices, 68% of the firms react
within three months, as long as they react, for an increased demand, as against 61 % for a
higher cost. These figures are respectively 72% and 61% in the case of negative shocks that
lead to a decrease in price.
7.3 Asymmetries in the ratings of the theories
Two of the upper grade theories, despite the fact that they perform very well both to explain
rigidity upwards and downwards, offer asymmetries in their rating (see table 6.1). Cost-based
pricing theories (as far as intermediate commodity prices and labor costs are concerned) offer
38 This is not quite unexpected, since one can expect that a lot of manufactures are not subject to contradictory lasting changes
in their environment/production costs within two years.
39 The equality of thesetwo coefficientsis statistically rejected at the1% level.
40 The equality of coefficients on a pair-wise basis is not statistically rejected.
41 Differences in the mean lags are not significant.
42 In this case the equality of the mean lags is rejected at the 1% level.
43 In fact, they find that firms react significantly faster to cost increases than to demand increases, and significantly faster to
demand decreases than to cost decreases.
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concerned, an increase in productivity is more likely to lead to a decrease in prices than a
decrease in productivity might explain a price increase.
Asymmetries in the ratings of coordination failures are mostly due to the phrasing of the
questionnaire. When firms are asked “Does an increase/decrease in the price offered by your
competitors would induce you to raise/lower the price of your main product?”, the answer is
yes with an higher grade in the case of price decreases. When firms are asked “Is the risk that
your competitors will not adjust their price might deter you from adjusting your price?”, the
answer is yes with an higher grade in the case of price increases compared to decreases. One
can notice also the higher grade in the case of a price decrease (2.3) compared to an increase
(2.0) for the line “demand shocks”. Here appears again a recurrent result of this survey: prices
are more rigid downwards than upwards for cost shocks, whereas it is the other way round for
demand shocks.
7.4 Why do firms change their prices? More details.
In this section we try to determine which factors might increase the probability to change
prices in reaction to a demand or labor cost shock. The empirical model is very simple, and
directly follows the analysis presented in Small and Yates (1999) and Fabiani et al. (2004).
Kwapil et al. (2004) also present similar estimations for Austria.
The model tries to explain why firms consider that an increase (decrease) in labor cost or
demand is a reason to raise (lower) the price of their main product. Four dummies (0,1) are
created (from question 13) to capture the probability that firms would raise or lower prices in
response to a change in demand or labor costs (pud, pld, puc, plc). See appendix B for more
details.
Five kinds of explanations are considered: the degree of market competition, the type of
customer relationship, the cost structure, the existence of public price regulation schemes and
the exposition to foreign markets. The degree of market competition is measured by 4
dummies: Rivals_none, Rivals_5, Rivals_20,a n dRivals_more_than_20, constructed from
question 3, and measuring the fact that the firm has no competitors at all, less than 5, between
44 The phrasing of these theories was rather tautological as firms were not asked about lags.
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Customer_firms and Price_no_discr. The first one measures whether or not more than 60% of
the turnover generated by the main product is sold to other firms (question 4), and the second
one if the price is the same for all customers (question 6). Regulation of market price is
measured by Price_reg which is equal to 1 if the price is regulated (question 9). The dummy
for cost structure, MC, captures whether or not the marginal cost is constant (question 8). The
impact of “pricing to market” on price stickiness is measured by two different measures of the
exposition to foreign market: Ext_mkt and Exp_share. The first dummy equals 1 if foreign
markets are the most important for the firm and the second one if the firm’s export turnover is
higher than 40%. These two almost tautological variables come from two different parts of the
questionnaire (preliminary requirements and question 2) and so do not integrate exactly the
same information.
Finally, we decided to control for the type of manufacture (5 dummies), the size (6 dummies
constructed from the number of employees) and the geographical area (5 dummies) of the
firm.
Six regressions are run. One for each of the four explained variables mentioned above: price
response to a positive/negative demand/cost shocks, and two pooled regressions (with either
negative or positive shocks) on demand and costs. In these last two cases, a dummy is
introduced to identify whether or not the shock is positive. In order to get comparative results
we run our regressions on a common sample. Due to missing values we are left with only 882
observations. Probit estimates are given in tables 7.4.a to 7.4.c.
Our main results are the following. First, market structure affects price stickiness. The
variable measuring that a firm is in competition with less than 5 firms (Rivals_5) significantly
reduces the likelihood that prices will rise (decrease) in response to an increase (decrease) in
demand. This result also holds, as expected, when demand shocks are pooled. This result is
consistent with the results obtained by Small and Yates (1999) for the U.K. and by Fabiani et
al (2004) for Italy45, and Kwapil et al (2004) for Austria.46 If we look at the regressions
45 In their case, the significant variable is comp_press: a dummy which equals to 1 if the firm reports that its price would be
rather different or very different if there were no competitors on its market.
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matters only in the case of a positive shock (Rivals_5 and Rivals_20 are both significant). It
was not significant or ‘wrongly’ signed in the case of the U.K., and not significant either in
the case of Austria. In Italy, to be the leader on the market decreases the probability to change
prices in response to a cost shock (either positive or negative).
Second, the variable indicating whether firms consider their marginal cost is flat (MC) does
not significantly affect the likelihood that prices will rise (decrease) in response to an increase
(decrease) in demand. This is also the case in Austria for large demand shocks. It was
significantly negatively signed for an increase in demand in U.K. and Italy.
Third, the type of customers and the pricing strategy by type of customers modify price
stickiness in the following way. In France, non-price discrimination (dummy Price_no_discr)
decreases the probability to change prices in response to a demand shock (either positive or
negative) but the type of customer (dummy Customer_firms) has no impact on price changes.
In Italy, the variable Price_no_discr is not significant, while the variable Customer_firms
increases the probability to change price in response to an increase in demand. As far as cost
shocks (either positive or negative) are concerned, the fact that customers are mainly firms
(dummy Customer_firms) decreases the probability to change prices in France. In Italy,
Price_no_discr increases the probability to change prices only in the case of a negative cost
shock. This variable is not included in the Austrian estimations.
Fourth, Price regulation (Price_reg) decreases the probability to change prices in response to
a cost shock (either positive or negative), and price regulation has no impact in the case of a
demand shock (the dummy Price_reg is not significant).
Fifth, “pricing to market” has an impact on price stickiness. To have its main market on
foreign markets (Ext_mkt) increases the probability to raise prices in response to a rise in
demand, but not when demand falls (neither Ext_mkt nor Exp_share is significant). It is
significant at the 1% level for an increased demand in the case of Austria and at the 10% level
in the case of a decrease. This phenomenon is not significant for both demand shocks in Italy.
The fact that the firm’s export turnover is more than 40% (Exp_share) increases the
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the opposite of what is obtained for U.K., where the share of exportations decreases the
probability to change prices in response to a rise or a decrease in costs. The dummy Ext_mkt
is not significant in the case of a fall in costs but significantly negative when costs rise. So this
last effect probably offsets part of the previous one. The dummy Ext_mkt is significantly
negative for both cost shocks in Italy and not significant in Austria.
Results obtained with the pooled regressions confirm descriptive statistics given in section
7.2.a.: whereas a demand increase is significantly less likely to induce a price response than a
demand decrease, a cost increase is significantly more likely to induce a price change than a
cost decrease. These results are consistent with those obtained for U.K. and Italy.
8. Conclusions
This paper reports the results of a survey conducted by the Banque de France during Winter
2003-2004 to investigate the price-setting behavior of French manufacturing companies.
Prices are found to adjust infrequently; the median firm modifies its price only once a year.
Price reviews are more frequent than price changes; among firms reviewing their price on a
regular basis, the median firm reviews its price quarterly. Firms are found to follow either
time-dependent, state-dependent or both pricing rules. Moreover, the chosen interval of price
reviews depends on the probability that changes in the firms’ environment occur. Thus, it is
partly endogenous.
Coordination failure and nominal contracts (either written or implicit) are the most important
sources of price stickiness, while pricing thresholds and physical menu costs appear to be
totally unimportant.
Asymmetries in price stickiness are found to be different for cost shocks compared to demand
shocks: prices are more rigid downward than upward for cost shocks, while the reverse is true
for demand shocks.
This paper has provided some useful qualitative and quantitative information about the
microeconomic behavior of decision makers. Despite the fact that survey respondents were
asked only about their own behavior and not about their macroeconomic consequences, this
should lead to a better understanding of macroeconomic phenomena since this study improves
the knowledge of microfoundations of macroeconomic price adjustments. For instance, the
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it within 3 months, suggest that a simple macroeconomic model with a one-quarter lag in
price-setting may serve as a baseline case.
The results from this survey have also allowed us to built a unique dataset for France, which
leaves plenty of opportunities for further econometric investigations. For instance, the score
of each price-stickiness theory (e.g. explicit or implicit contracts) could be explained by firms'
characteristics.
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December 2004½_½_½_½_½___________________
Branch number and name
(To be returned to the BDF by
January the 12th at the latest)
COMPANY NAME ½____________________________________________________
FUNCTION OF RESPONDENT ½____________________________________________________
TURN OVER OUT OF TAX (thousands of euros) ½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½,0
SHARE OF EXPORTS IN TURNOVER (in %) ½_½_½_½,0 %
SIREN If possible
IDENTIFICATION NO.½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½_½ ESTABLISHMENT NO.½_½_½_½_½_½ APE CODE½_½_½_½_½
1993 Nomenclature (NAF)
MAIN PRODUCT (in full) ½_____________________________________________________
This questionnaire has been answered by: phone face to face interview other
1. What percentage of your turnover out of tax is accounted for by your main product?………… …………… … ……|_|_|_|,0%
● I do not know /I do not wish to answer … ….……..…
(9)
2. What percentage of your turnover out of tax is generated? · In France (incl. French overseas departments
and territories)
· In the euro area (excl. France) ………………..
· Outside the euro area ………..………………..
Total






3. On the French market and for your main product, with how
many companies are you in competition?
(tick only one answer)
· none...……….………...…………………
· 1 to 2………………………..…………………
· 3 to 4.. …………….…………………………...
· 5 to 10…………..……………...………………
· 11 to 20..…………..…….………..…………...
· More than 20…………….








4. On the French market and for your main product,w h a t
percentage of your turnover is accounted for by:
· Firms that subcontract work……………..
· Other firms…………………....………..
· Consumers (via your own distribution network,
retailers …)……………;………
· General government, local authorities …..
· Others (Specify)………..
Total
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December 2004Question 4bis. If your firm works as a subcontractor on
the French market for your main product, on who’s behalf
is it?
(tick only one answer)
· One firm……......…………………………
· Between 2 and 4 firms…..………………………
· Between 5 and 10 firms…………………………
· More than 10 firms……...…………………….






5. What percentage of your turnover out of tax generated by your main product on the French market is derived from a long-term
business relationship (e.g. existence of a written contract) ?
Long-term relationship with firms Long-term relationship with households
· Share of turnover…………
· Inapplicable to our firm……
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer ……




· Share of turnover……………………….
· Inapplicable to our firm………………….
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer…




6. In general, the purchase price (the price actually charged) of
your main product is
(maximum two answers)
· The same for all customers……..…………….
· Differentiated according to the quantity which is
sold……………………………………
· Decided case by case ………………





7. On the French market and for your main product, what is the
share, in percentage of your total cost of
(tick only one answer)
· Labor cost…………………..……………….
· Intermediate consumption cost………..………
· Fixed cost ………….………………………...
Total






8. How do your unit variable costs (costs of labor and of other
inputs by unit of production) change when there is an increase
in the level of production?










9. How do you usually set the price of your main product on the
French market?
If several situations arise, answer for the most significant.
(tick only one answer)
· A mark-up is applied to unit variable production
costs (your price is different from the price of
your competitors)...
· The market is very competitive and your price is
the same as the one of your competitors
· The price is regulated (e.g. medicines…)…
· Other (please specify)……….
______________________________________
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December 200410. In general, how often do you review the price of your main
product (without necessarily changing it)?
The exam must be complete enough to possibly lead to a
modification of price.






· Over one year ………………………………..
· Other (specify)
· No usual frequency……………………..










11. In general, when you change your price, do you take into
account the fact that the next price adjustment can only occur
after a certain period of time?
(tick only one answer)
· Yes……..…………….
· No…. ………..




12. On the French market, do customers sometimes benefit from discount prices on your main product?
(several possible answers for yes)
Firms Households
· Yes, depending on the quantity bought
· Yes, depending on the market situation
· Yes, at certain times of the year
· Yes, other (please specify)
______________________________________
· No







· Yes, depending on the quantity bought
· Yes, depending on the market situation
· Yes, at certain times of the year
· Yes, other (please specify)
______________________________________
· No







13. Which factors, among the ones listed below, would cause you to raise/lower the price of your main product on the French
market? For each factor, quote the relevant importance: (1) = unimportant; (2) =of minor importance; (3) = important ; (4) = very
important; (5) =this situation has not arisen during the last two years ; (9) = I do not know /I do not wish to answer;
The quotation for each factor might be different from one column to the other.
Reasons to raise the price of your main product Reasons to lower the price of your main product
· An increase in labor costs
· An increase in intermediate commodity prices
· A decrease in productivity
· An increase in demand
· A stock decrease or an increase in delivery
delay
· An increase in the price offered by your
competitor(s)
· A decrease in the number of your competitors
· Other (please specify)
______________________________________
· A decrease in labor costs
· A decrease in intermediate commodity prices
· An increase in productivity
· A decrease in demand
· A stock increase or a decrease in delivery
delay
· A decrease in the price offered by your
competitor(s)
· An increase in the number of your competitors
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December 200414. Which factors, among the ones listed below, might deter you from adjusting the price of your main product on the French
market? For each factor, quote the relevant importance: (1) = unimportant; (2) =of minor importance; (3) = important ; (4) = very
important; (5) =this situation has not arisen during the last two years ; (9) = I do not know /I do not wish to answer;
The quotation for each factor might be different from one column to the other.
Reasons to decide not to raise the price of your main product Reasons to decide not to lower the price of your main product
· The risk that your competitors will not adjust
their price
· The risk that you will subsequently have to
readjust your price in the opposite direction
· The existence of a written contract specifying
that price can only be adjusted when the
contract is renegotiated
· The existence of an implicit contract (regular
contact with a customer without any written
contract)
· A preference for maintaining price at a
psychological threshold (e.g. 499  instead of
502 )...…….
· The costs generated by price adjustments
(menu costs, IT costs…)………..……….
· Other (specify)
· The risk that your competitors will not adjust
their price
· The risk that you will subsequently have to
readjust your price in the opposite direction
· The existence of a written contract specifying
that price can only be adjusted when the
contract is renegotiated
· The existence of an implicit contract (regular
contact with a customer without any written
contract)
· A preference for maintaining price at a
psychological threshold (e.g. 499  instead of
494 )...…….
· The costs generated by price adjustments
(menu costs, IT costs…)………..……….
· Other (specify)
15. Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change in your environment (change in demand, competitive environment, etc…), do
you modify the price of your main product?
Increased demand and/or lower competition Lower demand and/or increased competition
· Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month
· Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months
· Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months
· With difficulty
· No
· This situation has not arisen during the last
two years
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer …..








· Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month
· Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months
· Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months
· With difficulty
· No
· This situation has not arisen during the last
two years
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer ……..








16. Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change in your unit variable production costs (costs of labor and of other inputs) on
the French market, do you modify the price of your main product?
Lower unit production costs Higher unit production costs
· Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month
· Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months
· Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months
· With difficulty
· No
· This situation has not arisen during the last
two years
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer ……..








· Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month
· Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months
· Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months
· With difficulty
· No
· This situation has not arisen during the last
two years
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer ……..
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December 200417. In 2003, how many times did you change the price of your main product?
Take as reference the price actually charged for a representative transaction
· I do not know /I do not wish to answer …….. ……
|_|_|_| times
(9)
17bis. Between January 2003 and December 2003, what has been (will be) the variation, in percent, of the price of
your main product on the French market?
Take as reference the price actually charged for a representative transaction
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Dependent variables
Pud = 1 if an increase in demand has an impact on price which is either “important” or “very important”
= 0 elsewhere
Pld = 1 if a decrease in demand has an impact on price which is either “important” or “very important”
= 0 elsewhere
Puc = 1 if an increase in costs (cost of labor) has an impact on price which is either “important” or “very
important”
= 0 elsewhere
Plc = 1 if a decrease in costs (cost of labor) has an impact on price which is either “important” or “very
important”
= 0 elsewhere
Pd = 1 if a variation in demand has an impact on price which is either “important” or “very important”
= 0 elsewhere





Exp_share = 1 if the firm’s percentage turnover due to exports is > 40%
= 0 elsewhere
Ext_mkt = 1 if the foreign market is the most important (in terms of turnover).
= 0 elsewhere
Competitive pressure
Rivals 4 dummies which capture the reported number of firm’s competitors: none, less than 5, between 5
and 20, more than 20.
Relationships with customers
Customer_firms = 1 if more than 60% of turnover generated by the “main product” is sold to other firms
= 0 elsewhere
Price_no_discr = 1 if the price is the same for all customers
= 0 elsewhere
Price_reg = 1 if the price is regulated
= 0 elsewhere
Marginal costs
MC = 1 if marginal costs are constant
= 0 elsewhere
Positive vs negative shocks
Demand_up = 1 if demand is increasing
= 0 elsewhere
Cost_up = 1 if costs are increasing
= 0 elsewhere
Control variables
Area 5 dummies which capture whether the firm is located in the North-west (North-west), in the North-
east (North-east), in the South-west (South-west), in the South-east (South-east), or around Paris
(Paris area).
Size 6 dummies which capture whether the firm has up to 19 employees, between 20 and 49
employees, between 50 and 99 employees, between 100 and 249 employees, between 250 and 499
employees, or more than 500 employees.
Sector 5 dummies which capture whether the firm’s activity is classified in the food, consumer goods,
motor vehicles, capital goods, or intermediate goods manufacture.
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December 2004Appendix C – Significance tests
Table C.7.2 reports results of tests for the significance of pair-wise reaction to shocks reported
in tables 7.2.a and 7.2.b. The figures contained in the table are the p-values related to the null
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in the initial Respondents Response
sample rate
Economic activity
EB. Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 724 267 36.9
EC. Manufacture of consumer goods 768 295 38.4
ED. Manufacture of motor vehicles 137 48 35.0
EE. Manufacture of capital goods 810 335 41.4
EF. Manufacture of intermediate goods 1914 717 37.5
Size
Up to 19 employees 102 40 39.2
20-49 employees 590 262 44.4
50-99 employees 789 306 38.8
100-249 employees 1380 528 38.3
250-499 employees 795 292 36.7
>500 employees 697 234 33.6
Geographical area
Paris area 388 134 34.5
North East 1373 527 38.4
North West 1009 418 41.4
South East 916 335 36.6
South West 667 248 37.2
Total 4353 1662 38.2
Table 2.1 - The sample
Table 2.2 - What is the percentage turnover
from your "main product"? (Quesion 1)






N. A.(1) 133 8.0
Total 1662 100.0
(1) Firms which did not provide an answer.
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December 2004Table 3.1.a - The most important market (in terms of turnover)
for the main product (Question 2)
France Other euro area Non-euro area N. A. Total Nb. of
countries countries Obs.
Total 57.8 19.7 13.2 9.3 100.0 1662
By type of good
Food products, beve-
rages and tobacco 83.4 5.1 5.4 6.1 100.0 194
Consumer goods 71.2 11.7 10.3 6.8 100.0 282
Motor vehicles 24.3 66.5 1.0 8.2 100.0 170
Capital goods 45.1 9.3 28.2 17.4 100.0 373
Intermediate goods 60.4 21.2 11.5 7.0 100.0 643
Table 3.1.b - The number of competitors on the French market
for the main product (Question 3)
N o n e 1t o2 3t o4 5t o1 0 1 1t o2 0 > 2 0 N .A . T o t a l N b .o fO b s .
Total 7.8 12.6 24.2 30.0 8.9 11.3 5.2 100.0 1662
By type of good
Food products, beve-
rages and tobacco 1.3 13.4 25.0 28.7 12.0 15.7 3.8 100.0 194
Consumer goods 0.8 7.3 23.4 23.5 17.2 15.6 12.3 100.0 282
Motor vehicles 3.0 2.9 11.5 72.5 1.4 1.1 7.5 100.0 170
Capital goods 14.5 20.7 22.1 27.5 4.7 7.7 2.8 100.0 373
Intermediate goods 10.3 12.4 28.8 23.5 8.7 12.9 3.3 100.0 643
Table 3.2 - Firms' main customers
for the main product (Question 4)
Firms that Other firms Consumers Public sector Others N. A. Total Nb. of Obs.
subcontract work (1)
Total 14.9 39.9 25.1 3.1 6.6 10.5 100.0 1662
By type of good
Food products, beve-
rages and tobacco 7.4 34.6 35.9 0.6 13.7 7.9 100.0 194
Consumer goods 12.0 42.6 27.2 3.8 6.5 7.9 100.0 282
Motor vehicles 14.5 14.8 65.5 0.7 3.3 1.3 100.0 170
Capital goods 13.5 40.7 22.6 6.5 6.9 9.7 100.0 373
Intermediate goods 19.3 46.5 11.7 2.1 5.1 15.3 100.0 643
(1) The firm which answered the survey works as a subcontractor, i. e. the firm is subcontrated.
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December 2004Table 3.3 - How do your unit variable costs change
when there is an increase in the level of production?
(Question 8)
Increase Unchanged Decrease N. A. N° firms
Total 10.6 35.7 35.9 17.8 1662
By type of good
Food products, beve-
rages and tobacco 11.5 37.5 42.5 8.6 194
Consumer goods 14.9 36.6 31.7 16.8 282
Motor vehicles 3.4 18.8 14.5 63.3 170
Capital goods 6.4 40.0 44.0 9.6 373
Intermediate goods 12.9 36.7 36.6 13.8 643
Table 4.1- How do you usually set the price of your main product?
(Question 9)
Total 36.9 35.1 4.0 17.1 6.9 1662
By type of good
Food products,
beve-rages and
tobacco 54.9 28.5 0.7 10.2 5.7 194
Consumer goods 33.3 31.5 20.7 8.1 6.4 282
Motor vehicles 9.2 9.3 0.0 79.3 2.2 170
Capital goods 39.0 43.9 1.3 9.4 6.4 373
Intermediate goods 39.1 40.5 0.2 11.2 9.0 643
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December 2004Table 4.2- The price of your main product is:
(Question 6)










The same for all
the customers
18.9 1.6 6.7 27.2
Differentiated






N. A. 6.9 6.9
Total 18.9 25.7 48.5 6.9 100.0
N.B. Firms were allowed to tick up to two answers (N° answers = 1662)
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December 2004Table 5.1.2 - In 2003, how many times did you actually change
the price of your main product in 2003?
(Question 17)
(percent)
0 1 2 3t o6 7t o1 2 o v e r1 2 T o t a l
Total 21.1 46.3 19.9 7.7 2.1 2.9 100
By type of good
Food products, beve-
rages and tobacco 10.4 67.0 9.3 5.8 1.7 5.7 100
Consumer goods 34.1 50.8 11.2 2.0 1.0 1.0 100
Motor vehicles 10.6 14.2 68.8 5.6 0.7 0.1 100
Capital goods 21.3 55.5 9.1 11.2 0.4 2.4 100
Intermediate goods 21.8 42.7 16.6 10.4 4.3 4.1 100
Note: For commodity interpretation the results are reported discarding non available
answers. The percentage of non available answers over total answers are respectively:
24.6% for total, 11.6, 15.5, 5.9, 38.7 and 29.4 for the different types of goods.
Table 5.1.3 - In 2003, how many times did you change
the price of your main product?
(Question 10 by question 17)
0 1 2 3t o6 7t o1 2 o v e r1 2 N .A . T o t a l N °f i r m s
Total 15.9 34.9 15.0 5.8 1.6 2.2 24.7 100.0 1662
Frequency of price review
Daily 5.7 17.1 3.5 10.5 4.8 30.5 27.9 100.0 52
Weekly 0.2 16.1 5.4 7.9 1.7 14.4 54.3 100.0 89
Monthly 10.9 36.5 7.6 12.5 6.9 0.9 24.6 100.0 281
Quaterly 6.3 24.2 47.9 10.9 0.3 0.0 10.4 100.0 295
Twice a year 8.1 37.1 43.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0 100.0 57
Yearly 22.3 55.3 7.1 1.1 0.0 0.1 14.0 100.0 558
Over one year 53.3 15.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 30.5 100.0 17
No usual frequency 22.5 21.1 2.6 0.5 1.5 0.1 51.8 100.0 137
Other 21.6 16.4 11.9 9.5 0.6 4.7 35.3 100.0 89
N. A. 27.1 7.4 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 64.2 100.0 86
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December 2004Table 5.2.a.1- Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change
in your environment on the French market
(change in demand, competitive environment, etc…),
do you modify the price of our main product?
(Question 15)
This situation has arisen during the last two years 78.5 84.6
Yes, changes are reported on prices 78.1 81.0
Yes, changes are fully reported on prices 73.2 81.8
Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month 42.8 27.4
Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months 25.2 41.9
Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months 32.0 30.6
Yes, changes are partly reported on prices 26.8 18.2
No, changes are not reported on prices 21.9 19.0
This situation has not arisen during the last two years 21.5 15.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 5.2.a.2 - Usually, in the event of a major and lasting change
in your unit variable production costs (costs of labor and of other inputs)
on the French market, do you modify the price of our main product?
(Question 16)
This situation has arisen during the last two years 90.7 85.5
Yes, changes are reported on prices 83.3 71.8
Yes, changes are fully reported on prices 56.7 71.3
Yes, with a delay shorter than 1 month 16.1 13.8
Yes, with a delay between 1 and 3 months 29.0 27.3
Yes, with a delay longer than 3 months 54.8 58.9
Yes, changes are partly reported on prices 43.3 28.7
No, changes are not reported on prices 16.7 28.2
This situation has not arisen during the last two years 9.3 14.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
production costs
Note: Percentages of non available answers over the total number of firms are respectively 12.3 and 13.4 for increased and
lower demand.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































* intermediate commodity prices 3.0 2.6
* labor costs 2.5 1.9
* productivity 1.8 2.2
*/ Coordination failure
* price offered by your competitor(s) 2.3 2.8
competitors will not adjust their price 3.0 2.1
Nominal contracts 2.7 2.5
2) "Average" grades
Implicit contracts 2.2 2.0
Temporary shocks 2.1 2.1
* Demand shock 2.0 2.3
* Nb. of competitors 1.8 2.0
3) "Bad" grades
Pricing points 1.7 1.6
* Stock/delivery 1.4 1.6
Physical menu costs 1.4 1.4
Table 6.1 Ratings of the theories by French decision makers
Notes: (*) from question 13 (reasons for price adjustments), otherwise
question 14 (reasons for price stickiness).
Equality in the mean scores on a pair-wise basis between "increase" and
"decrease" for each theory are all rejected with a p-value<0.0001, except for
temporary shocks (p=0.41) and physical menu costs (p=0.62) for which the
scores are the same.
Within increases, equality in the mean scores are all rejected with a p-
value<0.01 except when scores are equal. Within decreases, equality in the
mean scores are all rejected with a p-value<0.01 except for the three
following pairs: nb. of competitors vs temporary shocks (p=0.39),
competitors will not adjust their price against productivity (p=0.72), nominal
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December 2004Yes, changes are reported on prices 77.1 78.3 81.7 73.3
fully 72.1 80.4 59.3 71.6
partly 27.9 19.6 40.7 28.4
No, changes are not reported on prices 22.9 21.7 18.3 26.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number of observations 963 963 963 963
Weight 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Note: For the significance of proportion differences, see appendix C.
a delay shorter than 1 month
a delay between 1 and 3 months
a delay longer than 3 months
Number of observations
Weight
Note: For the significance of proportion differences, see appendix C.
Table 7.2.b How long does-it take to change prices in reaction to a shock?
















































(1) (2) (3) (4)
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December 2004Constant 0.08 0.72 0.29 0.04 0.13 0.56 0.11 0.48
Rivals_none 0.14 0.54 0.05 0.83
Rivals_5 -0.48 0.001 -0.59 <0.0001 -0.49 0.00 -0.49 <0.0001
Rivals_20 0.16 0.26 -0.02 0.88
Rivals_more_than_20 ref ref
MC 0.12 0.22 0.08 0.42
Customer_firms 0.05 0.66 -0.04 0.69
Price_no_discr -0.57 <0.0001 -0.62 <0.0001 -0.53 <0.0001 -0.56 <0.0001
Price_reg -4.92 0.97 -4.39 0.96
Ext_mkt 0.02 0.90 0.22 0.11 0.30 0.0086
Exp_share 0.02 0.89 0.13 0.33
Food 0.00 0.99 -0.02 0.87 -0.20 0.22 -0.20 0.21
Consumer goods -0.14 0.34 -0.29 0.03 -0.32 0.04 -0.47 0.00
Motor vehicles 0.20 0.40 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.64 0.20 0.40
Capital goods 0.43 0.00 0.41 0.0008 -0.08 0.52 -0.07 0.59
Intermediate goods ref ref ref ref
Paris area -0.33 0.05 -0.32 0.05 -0.67 0.0003 -0.62 0.0006
North-west -0.51 0.00 -0.54 0.00 -0.41 0.01 -0.43 0.005
North-east -0.20 0.16 -0.24 0.07 -0.25 0.08 -0.24 0.09
South-west -0.33 0.06 -0.33 0.05 -0.12 0.48 -0.10 0.58
South-east ref ref ref ref
0-19 employees -1.21 0.07 -1.24 0.06 -1.57 0.06 -1.56 0.06
20-49 employees 0.60 0.01 0.59 0.00 -0.49 0.06 -0.50 0.05
50-99 employees 0.05 0.79 0.09 0.63 -0.37 0.08 -0.32 0.11
100-249 employees -0.15 0.24 -0.10 0.39 -0.28 0.04 -0.24 0.07
250-499 employees 0.27 0.04 0.29 0.02 0.03 0.82 0.05 0.67
at least 500 employees ref ref ref ref
Number of observations 882 882 882 882
Weight 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Log L -509.1 -518.9 -452.7 -459.9
Pseudo R-Square 0.211 0.185 0.189 0.168
Chi-Square (dof) 147.9 (22) <0.0001 128.4 (15) <0.0001 123.1 (22) <0.0001 108.6 (16) <0.0001
Table 7.4.a- Price adjustment in reponse to a demand shock
(Probit estimates)
Reduce price in response to a fall in demand Raise price in response to a rise in demand
Notes: Weighted estimates. Values in italics are the estimated p-values of the test statistics. Columns (1) and (3) present
results obtained including all the variables in regressions; columns (2) and (4) present those obtained with only the significant
ones.
(PLD) (PUD)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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December 2004Constant -0.81 0.0004 -0.84 <0.0001 -0.41 0.05 -0.41 0.05
Rivals_none 0.30 0.22 0.44 0.07 0.43 0.07
Rivals_5 -0.03 0.87 -0.32 0.03 -0.32 0.02
Rivals_20 0.00 1.00 -0.28 0.05 -0.28 0.05
Rivals_more_than_20 ref ref ref
Customer_firms -0.45 <0.0001 -0.46 <0.0001 -0.56 <0.0001 -0.56 <0.0001
Price_no_discr 0.03 0.84 -0.03 0.83
Price_reg -0.97 0.005 -0.93 0.01 -1.57 <0.0001 -1.58 <0.0001
Ext_mkt -0.13 0.36 -0.24 0.09 -0.24 0.09
Exp_share 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.23 0.07
Food 0.09 0.61 0.10 0.54 0.12 0.45 0.11 0.46
Consumer goods 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.05 0.49 0.00 0.48 0.00
Motor vehicles 1.12 <0.0001 1.19 <0.0001 0.32 0.20 0.32 0.20
Capital goods 0.51 0.0001 0.52 <0.0001 0.49 <0.0001 0.49 <0.0001
Intermediate goods ref ref ref ref
Paris area -0.29 0.13 -0.26 0.16 -0.28 0.11 -0.28 0.11
North-west 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.34 0.03 0.34 0.03
North-east 0.01 0.94 0.02 0.89 0.35 0.02 0.35 0.02
South-west -0.27 0.17 -0.24 0.22 0.16 0.35 0.16 0.35
South-east ref ref ref ref
0-19 employees -0.47 0.53 -0.45 0.55 -0.30 0.64 -0.30 0.64
20-49 employees -0.20 0.48 -0.20 0.46 0.20 0.39 0.20 0.38
50-99 employees 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.17 0.88 <0.0001 0.88 <0.0001
100-249 employees 0.14 0.31 0.15 0.27 0.64 <0.0001 0.64 <0.0001
250-499 employees 0.14 0.30 0.13 0.32 0.46 0.0004 0.46 0.0004
at least 500 employees ref ref ref ref
Number of observations 882 882 882 882
Weight 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Log L -423.7 -425.3 -500.8 -500.8
Pseudo R-Square 0.143 0.138 0.224 0.224
Chi-Square (dof) 86.5 (21) <0.0001 83.3 (16) <0.0001 157.9 (21) <0.0001 157.8 (20) <0.0001
Table 7.4.b - Price adjustment in reponse to a cost shock
(Probit estimates)
Reduce price in response to a fall in costs Raise price in response to a rise in costs
Notes: Weighted estimates. Values in italics are the estimated p-values of the test statistics. Columns (1) and (3) present
results obtained including all the variables in regressions; columns (2) and (4) present those obtained with only the significant
ones.
(PLC) (PUC)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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December 2004Constant 0.27 0.23 0.36 0.03 -0.87 <0.0001 -0.99 <0.0001
Demand_up/Cost_up -0.38 <0.0001 -0.71 <0.0001 0.52 <0.0001 0.51 <0.0001
Rivals_none 0.11 0.64 0.36 0.12
Rivals_5 -0.46 0.002 -0.53 <0.0001 -0.19 0.21 -0.16 0.11
Rivals_20 0.08 0.57 -0.15 0.31
Rivals_more_than_20 ref ref
MC 0.10 0.32
Customer_firms 0.01 0.95 -0.51 <0.0001 -0.51 <0.0001
Price_no_discr -0.55 <0.0001 -0.59 <0.0001 -0.004 0.97
Price_reg -4.74 0.97 -1.28 0.0003 -1.20 0.0005
Ext_mkt 0.12 0.40 0.17 0.13 -0.18 0.20
Exp_share 0.07 0.60 0.23 0.08 0.17 0.12
Food -0.09 0.55 -0.10 0.50 0.11 0.49 0.13 0.42
Consumer goods -0.23 0.13 -0.38 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.37 0.01
Motor vehicles 0.16 0.50 0.24 0.30 0.73 0.003 0.84 0.0003
Capital goods 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.49 0.0001 0.52 <0.0001
Intermediate goods ref ref ref ref
Paris area -0.47 0.01 -0.43 0.01 -0.28 0.13 -0.24 0.19
North-west -0.46 0.003 -0.48 0.001 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.04
North-east -0.22 0.12 -0.24 0.09 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.18
South-west -0.23 0.18 -0.22 0.21 -0.03 0.88 0.02 0.91
South-east ref ref ref ref
0-19 employees -1.36 0.06 -1.36 0.06 -0.39 0.57 -0.38 0.58
20-49 employees 0.15 0.48 0.15 0.48 0.02 0.93 0.06 0.81
50-99 employees -0.14 0.47 -0.09 0.63 0.57 0.003 0.64 0.001
100-249 employees -0.21 0.11 -0.16 0.21 0.41 0.002 0.42 0.001
250-499 employees 0.15 0.24 0.18 0.16 0.31 0.02 0.32 0.02
at least 500 employees ref ref ref ref
Number of observations 1764 1764 1764 1764
Weight 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86
Log L -490.7 -498.8 -472.4 -476.1
Pseudo R-Square 0.152 0.134 0.155 0.146
Chi-Square (dof) 130.1 (23) <0.0001 114.1 (17) <0.0001 129.1 (22) <0.0001 121.7 (18) <0.0001
Table 7.4.c- Price adjustment: pooling positive and negative shocks
(Probit estimates)
Change price in response to a change in demand Change price in response to a change in costs
Notes: Weighted estimates. Values in italics are the estimated p-values of the test statistics. Columns (1) and (3) present
results obtained including all the variables in regressions; columns (2) and (4) present those obtained with only the significant
ones.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Significance on table 7.2.a
Yes, fully 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
Yes, partly 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.00
No 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Significance on table 7.2.b
a delay shorter than 1 month 0.01 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.00 0.00
a delay between 1 and 3 months 0.67 0.54 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.08
a delay longer than 3 months 0.01 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: significance tests on table 7.2.a are computed on the proportions mentionned below.
Table 7.2.a (1) (2) (3) (4)
Yes, fully 55.6 63.0 48.4 52.5
Yes, partly 21.5 15.3 33.3 20.8
No 22.9 21.7 18.3 26.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table C.7.2 Significance tests of reaction to shock differences in tables 7.2.a and 7.2.b
63
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 423
December 200464
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 423
December 2004
European Central Bank working paper series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website
(http://www.ecb.int)
388 “Euro area inflation differentials” by I. Angeloni and M. Ehrmann, September 2004.
389 “Forecasting with a Bayesian DSGE model: an application to the euro area” by F. Smets
and R. Wouters, September 2004.
390 “Financial markets’ behavior around episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance”
by S. Ardagna, September 2004.
391 “Comparing shocks and frictions in US and euro area business cycles: a Bayesian DSGE
approach” by F. Smets and R. Wouters, September 2004.
392 “The role of central bank capital revisited” by U. Bindseil, A. Manzanares and B. Weller,
September 2004.
393 ”The determinants of the overnight interest rate in the euro area” by J. Moschitz,
September 2004.
394 ”Liquidity, money creation and destruction, and the returns to banking”
by Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti, A. Erosa and T. Temzelides, September 2004.
395 “Fiscal sustainability and public debt in an endogenous growth model”
by J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga and J.-P. Vidal, October 2004.
396 “The short-term impact of government budgets on prices: evidence from macroeconomic
models” by J. Henry, P. Hernández de Cos and S. Momigliano, October 2004.
397 “Determinants of euro term structure of credit spreads” by A. Van Landschoot, October 2004.
398 “Mergers and acquisitions and bank performance in Europe: the role of strategic similarities”
by Y. Altunbas and D. Marqués Ibáñez, October 2004.
399 “Sporadic manipulation in money markets with central bank standing facilities”
by C. Ewerhart, N. Cassola, S. Ejerskov and N. Valla, October 2004.
400 “Cross-country differences in monetary policy transmission” by R.-P. Berben, A. Locarno,
J. Morgan and J. Valles, October 2004.
401 “Foreign direct investment and international business cycle comovement” by W. J. Jansen
and A. C. J. Stokman, October 2004.
402 “Forecasting euro area inflation using dynamic factor measures of underlying inflation”
by G. Camba-Méndez and G. Kapetanios, November 2004.
403 “Financial market integration and loan competition: when is entry deregulation socially
beneficial?” by L. Kaas, November 2004.
404 “An analysis of systemic risk in alternative securities settlement architectures” by G. Iori,
November 2004.
405 “A joint econometric model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics” by P. Hördahl,
O. Tristani and D. Vestin, November 2004.
406 “Labour market reform and the sustainability of exchange rate pegs” by O. Castrén, T. Takalo
and G. Wood, November 2004.
407 “Banking consolidation and small business lending” by E. Takáts, November 2004.65
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 423
December 2004
408 “The great inflation, limited asset markets participation and aggregate demand: FED policy was
better than you think” by F. O. Bilbiie, November 2004.
409 “Currency mismatch, uncertainty and debt maturity structure” by M. Bussière, M. Fratzscher
and W. Koeniger, November 2004.
410 “Do options-implied RND functions on G3 currencies  move around the times of interventions
on the JPY/USD exchange rate? by O. Castrén, November 2004.
411 “Fiscal discipline and the cost of public debt service: some estimates for OECD countries”
by S. Ardagna, F. Caselli and T. Lane, November 2004.
412 “The real effects of money growth in dynamic general equilibrium” by L. Graham and
D. J. Snower, November 2004.
413 “An empirical analysis of price setting behaviour in the Netherlands in the period
1998-2003 using micro data” by N. Jonker, C. Folkertsma and H. Blijenberg, November 2004.
414 “Inflation persistence in the European Union, the euro area, and the United States”
by G. Gadzinski and F. Orlandi, November 2004.
415 “How persistent is disaggregate inflation? An analysis across EU15 countries and
HICP sub-indices” by P. Lünnemann and T. Y. Mathä, November 2004.
416 “Price setting behaviour in Spain: stylised facts using consumer price micro data”
by L. J. Álvarez and I. Hernando, November 2004.
417 “Staggered price contracts and inflation persistence: some general results”
by K. Whelan, November 2004.
418 “Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior”
by G. Coenen and A. T. Levin, November 2004.
419 “The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries”
by M. Hallerberg, R. Strauch and J. von Hagen, December 2004.
420 “On prosperity and posterity: the need for fiscal discipline in a monetary union” by C. Detken,
V. Gaspar and B. Winkler, December 2004.
421 “EU fiscal rules: issues and lessons from political economy” by L. Schuknecht, December 2004.
422 “What determines fiscal balances? An empirical investigation in determinants of changes in
OECD budget balances” by M. Tujula and G. Wolswijk, December 2004.
423 “Price setting in France: new evidence from survey data” by  C. Loupias and R. Ricart,
December 2004.